To ensure that the agency has complied with all applicable laws and regulations.

To determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

To protect national security and sensitive intelligence information.

To ensure that the agency's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The court may review all aspects of the agency's decision, including the agency's factual findings, legal conclusions, and policy choices.

The court's review is limited to the administrative record, which consists of the documents and evidence that the agency relied on in making its decision.

The court may only review the agency's decision for errors of law.

The court may only review the agency's decision for constitutional violations.

The arbitrary and capricious standard.

The substantial evidence standard.

The de novo standard.

The abuse of discretion standard.

The agency bears the burden of proof to show that its decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The party challenging the agency's decision bears the burden of proof to show that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

The burden of proof is shared between the agency and the party challenging the decision.

There is no burden of proof in a judicial review of an agency intelligence decision.

The agency's expertise in the area of intelligence.

The nature and quality of the evidence supporting the agency's decision.

The agency's compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

The potential impact of the agency's decision on national security.

The state secrets privilege.

The national security exemption.

The doctrine of deference.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

A privilege that allows the government to withhold information from disclosure in court if the information would harm national security.

A privilege that allows the government to withhold information from disclosure in court if the information would reveal the identity of a confidential informant.

A privilege that allows the government to withhold information from disclosure in court if the information would reveal trade secrets or other confidential business information.

A privilege that allows the government to withhold information from disclosure in court if the information would reveal personal information about an individual.

An exemption from the Freedom of Information Act that allows the government to withhold information from disclosure if the information would harm national security.

An exemption from the Privacy Act that allows the government to collect and maintain information about individuals without their knowledge or consent if the information is necessary for national security purposes.

An exemption from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreign nationals without a warrant if the surveillance is necessary for national security purposes.

An exemption from the Electronic Communications Privacy Act that allows the government to intercept electronic communications without a warrant if the interception is necessary for national security purposes.

A doctrine that requires courts to defer to the expertise of administrative agencies in their areas of specialization.

A doctrine that requires courts to defer to the policy choices of administrative agencies.

A doctrine that requires courts to defer to the factual findings of administrative agencies.

A doctrine that requires courts to defer to the legal conclusions of administrative agencies.

A doctrine that requires a party to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an agency decision.

A doctrine that requires a party to exhaust all judicial remedies before seeking administrative review of an agency decision.

A doctrine that requires a party to exhaust all administrative and judicial remedies before seeking review of an agency decision by the President.

A doctrine that requires a party to exhaust all administrative and judicial remedies before seeking review of an agency decision by Congress.

The lack of access to classified information.

The difficulty in evaluating the credibility of intelligence sources.

The need to balance the need for judicial review with the need to protect national security.

All of the above.

By using in camera review of classified information.

By appointing special masters to review classified information.

By relying on the expertise of intelligence agencies.

By balancing the need for judicial review with the need to protect national security.

Judicial review of agency intelligence decisions will become more limited in the future.

Judicial review of agency intelligence decisions will become more expansive in the future.

Judicial review of agency intelligence decisions will remain the same in the future.

It is impossible to predict the future of judicial review of agency intelligence decisions.

United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (1972)

Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims (1985)

Department of Defense v. FLRA (1987)

All of the above.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

The National Security Act of 1947

All of the above.