Classical logic deals with statements that are either true or false, while modal logic deals with statements that are possibly true or possibly false.

Classical logic is based on the principle of bivalence, while modal logic is based on the principle of multivalence.

Classical logic is concerned with the relationship between premises and conclusions, while modal logic is concerned with the relationship between possible worlds.

Classical logic is used to reason about the real world, while modal logic is used to reason about hypothetical worlds.

¬

∧

∨

□

□φ ≡ ¬◇¬φ

◇φ ≡ ¬□¬φ

□φ ≡ ◇φ

◇φ ≡ □φ

If φ is true in a possible world w, then □φ is true in all possible worlds.

If φ is true in all possible worlds, then □φ is true in w.

If φ is false in a possible world w, then ◇φ is true in all possible worlds.

If φ is false in all possible worlds, then ◇φ is true in w.

If □φ is true in a possible world w, then φ is true in w.

If ◇φ is true in a possible world w, then φ is true in w.

If □φ is true in all possible worlds, then φ is true in w.

If ◇φ is true in all possible worlds, then φ is true in w.

To analyze the behavior of rational agents in strategic situations.

To study the effects of uncertainty on economic decision-making.

To develop models of economic growth and development.

To analyze the relationship between economic institutions and economic outcomes.

A game in which all players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A game in which all players have incomplete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A game in which some players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players, while other players have incomplete information.

A game in which no players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A game in which all players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A game in which all players have incomplete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A game in which some players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players, while other players have incomplete information.

A game in which no players have complete information about the actions and payoffs of all other players.

A set of strategies for the players in a game such that no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy.

A set of strategies for the players in a game such that each player's payoff is the same.

A set of strategies for the players in a game such that each player's payoff is greater than or equal to the payoff of any other player.

A set of strategies for the players in a game such that each player's payoff is less than or equal to the payoff of any other player.

A theorem that states that in a two-person zero-sum game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player's payoff is the same.

A theorem that states that in a two-person zero-sum game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player's payoff is greater than or equal to the payoff of any other player.

A theorem that states that in a two-person zero-sum game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player's payoff is less than or equal to the payoff of any other player.

A theorem that states that in a two-person zero-sum game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which no player can improve their payoff by unilaterally changing their strategy.

A transformation that converts a two-person zero-sum game into a two-person non-zero-sum game.

A transformation that converts a two-person non-zero-sum game into a two-person zero-sum game.

A transformation that converts a two-person game into a one-person game.

A transformation that converts a one-person game into a two-person game.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is Pareto efficient and individually rational.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is Pareto efficient but not individually rational.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is individually rational but not Pareto efficient.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is neither Pareto efficient nor individually rational.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is Pareto efficient and individually rational.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is Pareto efficient but not individually rational.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is individually rational but not Pareto efficient.

A solution to a two-person non-zero-sum game that is neither Pareto efficient nor individually rational.

A model of bargaining in which the players make alternating offers.

A model of bargaining in which the players make simultaneous offers.

A model of bargaining in which the players make offers in a random order.

A model of bargaining in which the players make offers in a predetermined order.

An approach to bargaining that uses axioms to derive a unique solution to a bargaining problem.

An approach to bargaining that uses axioms to derive a set of possible solutions to a bargaining problem.

An approach to bargaining that uses axioms to derive a range of possible solutions to a bargaining problem.

An approach to bargaining that uses axioms to derive a unique solution to a bargaining problem, but only if the bargaining problem is symmetric.