Husserl's primary concern in 'The Phenomenology of Time' is to explore the relationship between time and consciousness, arguing that time is not an objective entity but rather a subjective experience that is constituted by consciousness.

Husserl argues that the fundamental characteristic of time is its unity, meaning that it is experienced as a single, continuous flow. This unity is what allows us to perceive time as a meaningful and coherent dimension of our experience.

Husserl uses the term 'now-point' to describe the subjective experience of the present moment. The now-point is the point in time at which we are immediately aware of our experience. It is constantly moving forward, creating a sense of temporal flow.

Husserl uses the term 'retentional horizon' to describe the retention of past experiences in consciousness. The retentional horizon is the range of past experiences that are still present in consciousness, even though they are no longer the focus of our attention.

Husserl uses the term 'protentional horizon' to describe the anticipation of future experiences in consciousness. The protentional horizon is the range of future experiences that are not yet present in consciousness, but which are anticipated based on our past experiences and expectations.

Husserl argues that time and consciousness are mutually constitutive, meaning that they are interdependent and cannot be understood separately. Time is constituted by consciousness, and consciousness is constituted by time.

Husserl's analysis of time shows that subjectivity and time are mutually constitutive, meaning that they are interdependent and cannot be understood separately. Subjectivity is constituted by time, and time is constituted by subjectivity.

Husserl's phenomenology of time is primarily concerned with the subjective experience of time, rather than its objective structure. The objective structure of time is not a key concept in his analysis.

Husserl argues that memory plays a crucial role in our experience of time. Memory allows us to recall past events, anticipate future events, and provide a sense of continuity to our experience.

Husserl's phenomenology of time shows that the self and the world are mutually constitutive, meaning that they are interdependent and cannot be understood separately. The self is constituted by the world, and the world is constituted by the self.

Bertrand Russell was not influenced by Husserl's phenomenology of time. Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas were all influenced by Husserl's work.

Husserl's phenomenology of time has been criticized for being too subjective, too abstract, and too idealistic. Some critics argue that it is too focused on the individual's subjective experience of time and neglects the objective structure of time. Others argue that it is too abstract and does not provide a concrete account of how time is experienced. Still others argue that it is too idealistic and fails to account for the role of the body and the social world in our experience of time.

Despite the criticisms, Husserl's phenomenology of time has had a lasting significance. It provides a new way of understanding the relationship between time and consciousness, opens up new avenues for exploring the relationship between the self and the world, and challenges traditional notions of time and subjectivity.

'The Phenomenology of Time' was originally published in German in 1905.

J.H. Findlay translated 'The Phenomenology of Time' into English in 1964.