Philosophical zombies are hypothetical beings that are physically identical to humans but lack consciousness. They are often used in philosophical arguments to challenge the idea that consciousness is a necessary property of physical matter.

The explanatory gap is the gap between the physical properties of the brain and the subjective experience of consciousness. It is a problem in the philosophy of mind because it is unclear how physical processes in the brain can give rise to subjective conscious experiences.

David Chalmers is a philosopher who is most closely associated with the concept of philosophical zombies. He has argued that the existence of philosophical zombies is a possibility that cannot be ruled out, and that this has implications for our understanding of the relationship between consciousness and the physical world.

The main argument for the possibility of philosophical zombies is the argument from conceivability. This argument states that it is possible to conceive of a being that is physically identical to a human but lacks consciousness. If it is possible to conceive of such a being, then it is possible that such a being exists.

The possibility of philosophical zombies has a number of implications, including that consciousness is not a necessary property of physical matter, that the laws of physics are incomplete, and that the material world is not all that there is.

The most common objection to the argument from conceivability is the objection from intuition. This objection states that it is simply impossible to conceive of a being that is physically identical to a human but lacks consciousness. However, this objection is controversial, and there are a number of philosophers who argue that it is possible to conceive of such a being.

The main argument against the possibility of philosophical zombies is the argument from coherence. This argument states that the concept of a philosophical zombie is incoherent because it is impossible to conceive of a being that is physically identical to a human but lacks consciousness. However, this argument is also controversial, and there are a number of philosophers who argue that it is possible to conceive of such a being.

The explanatory gap is a more general problem than the problem of other minds. The explanatory gap is the problem of how physical processes in the brain can give rise to subjective conscious experiences. The problem of other minds is the problem of how we can know that other people have conscious experiences. The explanatory gap is a more general problem because it applies to all conscious experiences, not just the conscious experiences of other people.

There are a number of proposed solutions to the explanatory gap, including physicalism, dualism, neutral monism, and panpsychism. Physicalism is the view that everything is physical. Dualism is the view that there are two fundamental substances, physical matter and consciousness. Neutral monism is the view that there is only one fundamental substance, which is neither physical nor mental. Panpsychism is the view that everything has some degree of consciousness.

Philosophical zombies are typically said to lack consciousness, but they are often also said to be capable of rational thought and feeling emotions. This is because these properties are not necessarily dependent on consciousness.

The main objection to physicalism as a solution to the explanatory gap is the objection from qualia. Qualia are the subjective, qualitative aspects of conscious experience, such as the taste of coffee or the feeling of pain. Physicalists argue that qualia can be explained in terms of physical processes in the brain, but many philosophers argue that this is impossible.

The main objection to dualism as a solution to the explanatory gap is the objection from interaction. This objection states that it is impossible for a non-physical mind to interact with a physical body. However, this objection is controversial, and there are a number of philosophers who argue that it is possible for a non-physical mind to interact with a physical body.

The main objection to neutral monism as a solution to the explanatory gap is the objection from qualia. This objection states that it is impossible for a neutral substance to have subjective, qualitative experiences. However, this objection is controversial, and there are a number of philosophers who argue that it is possible for a neutral substance to have subjective, qualitative experiences.

The main objection to panpsychism as a solution to the explanatory gap is the objection from parsimony. This objection states that panpsychism is a more complex and less parsimonious theory than other theories of consciousness, such as physicalism, dualism, and neutral monism. However, this objection is controversial, and there are a number of philosophers who argue that panpsychism is a more parsimonious theory than other theories of consciousness.

There is no consensus among philosophers about the explanatory gap. Some philosophers argue that the explanatory gap is a real problem, while others argue that it has been closed. There is also no consensus among philosophers about which solution to the explanatory gap is the best.