G.E. Moore is widely regarded as the father of ethical prescriptivism due to his influential work, Principia Ethica, published in 1903.

Ethical prescriptivism holds that moral judgments are objective statements that can be true or false and are not merely expressions of personal preferences or subjective feelings.

Ethical prescriptivists argue that the primary purpose of moral language is to guide human action and behavior by prescribing what is morally right or wrong.

Deontology, particularly Kantian ethics, is often associated with ethical prescriptivism due to its emphasis on objective moral principles and duties.

The naturalistic fallacy refers to the attempt to derive moral principles from non-moral facts, which ethical prescriptivists argue is a logical error.

G.E. Moore, in his influential work Principia Ethica, argued against the naturalistic fallacy and defended the idea that moral properties are non-natural and cannot be reduced to non-moral facts.

The open-question argument challenges the idea that moral judgments can be objectively true or false by arguing that there is no way to determine their truth value independently of personal preferences or subjective feelings.

R.M. Hare, in his work The Language of Morals, defended ethical prescriptivism against the open-question argument by arguing that moral judgments can be objectively evaluated based on their logical consistency and coherence.

Ethical prescriptivism and moral relativism are contrasting ethical theories. Ethical prescriptivism asserts that moral judgments are objective and based on universal principles, while moral relativism maintains that moral judgments are subjective and vary across cultures and individuals.

Deontology, particularly Kantian ethics, emphasizes the importance of following moral rules and duties, regardless of the consequences. It holds that moral actions are those that are done out of respect for moral principles, rather than for the sake of achieving a desired outcome.

One of the main criticisms of ethical prescriptivism is that it fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for how moral values can be objective and universally binding, given that they are not derived from empirical facts or logical reasoning.

David emotivism, associated with philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson, argues that moral judgments are expressions of emotions or attitudes rather than statements of fact. They hold that moral language is primarily used to express feelings of approval or disapproval, rather than to convey objective truths.

Ethical prescriptivism is concerned with providing guidance for action by prescribing what is morally right or wrong, while metaethics examines the nature and meaning of moral language, including questions about the objectivity of moral values, the relationship between moral judgments and facts, and the role of emotions and reason in moral decision-making.

W.D. Ross, a prominent intuitionist philosopher, argued that moral judgments are based on self-evident moral intuitions rather than reason or logical argumentation. He held that certain moral principles, such as the duty to keep promises or to avoid harming others, are known through intuition and do not require further justification.

Ethical prescriptivism is primarily concerned with providing guidance for action by prescribing what is morally right or wrong, while consequentialism emphasizes the importance of considering the consequences of actions in moral decision-making. Consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, judge the morality of actions based on their overall consequences, rather than on adherence to moral rules or principles.