The Phenomenal Concept Strategy argues that consciousness is a non-physical process because it is not reducible to physical processes. Physical processes are objective and can be described in terms of their physical properties, such as mass, energy, and location. However, consciousness is subjective and cannot be described in terms of physical properties.

Phenomenal concepts are subjective because they are based on our own personal experiences. Physical concepts are objective because they are based on the properties of the physical world. Phenomenal concepts are abstract because they cannot be directly observed. Physical concepts are concrete because they can be directly observed.

The argument from phenomenal concepts is an argument for the existence of qualia, which are the subjective, qualitative properties of conscious experience. The argument goes as follows: (1) Phenomenal concepts are subjective and cannot be reduced to physical concepts. (2) Qualia are the subjective, qualitative properties of conscious experience. (3) Therefore, qualia cannot be reduced to physical properties. (4) Therefore, qualia must be non-physical.

The problem of phenomenal consciousness is the problem of explaining how consciousness can arise from physical processes, how consciousness can be subjective, and how consciousness can be qualia. These are all difficult problems that have not yet been solved.

The Phenomenal Concept Strategy has been criticized for being too vague, too abstract, and not falsifiable. Some critics have argued that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy does not provide a clear definition of consciousness or qualia. Others have argued that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is too abstract and does not provide a concrete explanation of how consciousness can arise from physical processes. Still others have argued that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy is not falsifiable because it is not possible to design an experiment that could disprove the theory.