Information Economics primarily investigates how the availability, quality, and distribution of information influence economic choices and outcomes.

Asymmetric Information refers to situations where one party in an economic transaction possesses more or better information than the other party.

Adverse Selection occurs when one party in a transaction has private information that the other party does not, leading to an imbalance in the distribution of risk.

Moral Hazard occurs when one party in a transaction can take actions that affect the other party without the other party's knowledge, leading to an imbalance in the distribution of risk.

Signaling refers to the process by which a party with private information sends a signal to another party to convey information about the private information.

In a market with adverse selection, the presence of hidden information leads to a higher equilibrium price due to the risk premium demanded by the party with less information.

In a market with moral hazard, the presence of hidden actions leads to a higher equilibrium quantity due to the incentive for the party with more information to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of the other party.

Signaling can take various forms, including releasing financial reports, giving speeches, or buying branded products, all of which are examples of sending signals to convey information.

Price discrimination is not typically used to address asymmetric information in markets, as it involves charging different prices to different consumers for the same product or service.

Screening is used to identify and separate individuals based on their private information, reduce the impact of adverse selection, and improve the efficiency of markets.

Background checks are not typically used as a screening mechanism in markets, as they are more commonly associated with employment or security purposes.

Certification and licensing serve multiple purposes, including reducing information asymmetry, improving product quality, and protecting consumers from fraud.

Product warranties are not typically considered a form of certification or licensing in Information Economics, as they are more commonly associated with product quality and consumer protection.

Warranties are primarily used to reduce adverse selection by providing a signal of product quality and reducing the risk for consumers.

Service contracts are not typically considered a type of warranty in Information Economics, as they are more commonly associated with product maintenance and repair.