Qualia

Phenomenal consciousness

Subjective experience

All of the above

David Chalmers

Thomas Nagel

Daniel Dennett

John Searle

Conscious experience is a representation of the physical world.

Conscious experience is identical to the physical world.

Conscious experience is independent of the physical world.

None of the above

The argument from qualia

The argument from illusion

The argument from introspection

The argument from zombies

Qualia are subjective and private, and therefore cannot be represented in the physical world.

Qualia are objective and public, and therefore can be represented in the physical world.

Qualia are both subjective and objective, and therefore can be represented in the physical world.

None of the above

Illusions show that our senses can be deceived, and therefore our conscious experience is not a reliable representation of the physical world.

Illusions show that our senses are not deceived, and therefore our conscious experience is a reliable representation of the physical world.

Illusions show that our senses are both deceived and not deceived, and therefore our conscious experience is a reliable representation of the physical world.

None of the above

Introspection shows that we have direct access to our own conscious experience, and therefore our conscious experience is a reliable representation of the physical world.

Introspection shows that we do not have direct access to our own conscious experience, and therefore our conscious experience is not a reliable representation of the physical world.

Introspection shows that we both have and do not have direct access to our own conscious experience, and therefore our conscious experience is a reliable representation of the physical world.

None of the above

Zombies are hypothetical creatures that are physically identical to humans but lack consciousness.

Zombies are hypothetical creatures that are physically identical to humans and have consciousness.

Zombies are hypothetical creatures that are physically different from humans and lack consciousness.

Zombies are hypothetical creatures that are physically different from humans and have consciousness.

Zombies are not possible.

Zombies are possible, but they are not relevant to the debate about consciousness.

Zombies are possible and relevant to the debate about consciousness, but they do not provide a conclusive argument against the representational theory of consciousness.

Zombies are possible and relevant to the debate about consciousness, and they provide a conclusive argument against the representational theory of consciousness.

The denial of the possibility of zombies.

The claim that zombies are not relevant to the debate about consciousness.

The claim that zombies do not provide a conclusive argument against the representational theory of consciousness.

The claim that zombies provide a conclusive argument against the representational theory of consciousness.

The problem of qualia

The problem of illusion

The problem of introspection

The problem of zombies

The representational theory of consciousness is likely to be replaced by a new theory of consciousness.

The representational theory of consciousness is likely to be refined and improved.

The representational theory of consciousness is likely to remain the dominant theory of consciousness.

None of the above

The development of new methods for studying consciousness.

The discovery of new facts about consciousness.

The development of new theories of consciousness.

All of the above

The study of the neural correlates of consciousness.

The study of the relationship between consciousness and the brain.

The study of the development of consciousness.

All of the above

To understand the nature of consciousness.

To develop new methods for studying consciousness.

To discover new facts about consciousness.

All of the above