Qualia are the subjective, conscious experiences of sensations, such as the taste of coffee or the feeling of pain.

David Chalmers is a philosopher who has written extensively about qualia and the phenomenal concept strategy.

The main argument of the phenomenal concept strategy is that qualia are not physical properties of the brain, because they are subjective and conscious, while physical properties are objective and unconscious.

The zombie argument is a thought experiment that attempts to show that qualia are not physical properties of the brain. It asks us to imagine a zombie, which is a creature that is physically identical to a human but lacks consciousness. If zombies are possible, then qualia cannot be physical properties of the brain, because zombies would have the same physical properties as humans but would lack qualia.

The knowledge argument is another thought experiment that attempts to show that qualia are not physical properties of the brain. It asks us to imagine a situation in which we have all of the physical information about the world, but we lack qualia. In this situation, we would not be able to know anything about the world, because we would not be able to experience it.

The inverted spectrum argument is a thought experiment that attempts to show that qualia are not physical properties of the brain. It asks us to imagine two people who have the same physical properties, but who have different qualia. For example, one person might experience the color red as we do, while the other person might experience it as green. If this is possible, then qualia cannot be physical properties of the brain, because two people with the same physical properties would have the same qualia.

The main criticism of the phenomenal concept strategy is that it relies on thought experiments that are not realistic, it assumes that qualia are real, and it does not provide a positive account of qualia.

The hard problem of consciousness is the question of how qualia are related to physical properties of the brain, why consciousness exists at all, and how consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes.

The easy problem of consciousness is the question of how consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes. The hard problem of consciousness is the question of how qualia are related to physical properties of the brain and why consciousness exists at all.

The representational theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness is a representation of the world. This means that consciousness is a way of making the world present to ourselves.

The enactive theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness is a product of the brain's activity. This means that consciousness is a result of the brain's interactions with the environment.

The panpsychist theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe. This means that consciousness is present in all things, not just in living things.

The integrated information theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness is a product of the brain's activity. This means that consciousness is a result of the brain's ability to integrate information from different parts of the brain.

The global workspace theory of consciousness is the view that consciousness is a product of the brain's activity. This means that consciousness is a result of the brain's ability to create a global workspace that integrates information from different parts of the brain.