The objective properties of objects

The subjective, conscious experiences of the world

The physical properties of objects

The mental properties of objects

The theory that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe

The theory that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain

The theory that consciousness is an illusion

The theory that consciousness is a product of evolution

The argument from consciousness

The argument from emergence

The argument from simplicity

The argument from naturalism

The problem of phenomenal consciousness

The problem of mental causation

The problem of the unity of consciousness

All of the above

That the universe is conscious

That all matter has some degree of consciousness

That consciousness is a fundamental property of reality

All of the above

David Chalmers

Thomas Nagel

Alfred North Whitehead

Bertrand Russell

Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective experience of consciousness, while access consciousness is the ability to report on one's conscious experiences.

Phenomenal consciousness is the ability to report on one's conscious experiences, while access consciousness is the subjective experience of consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness is the ability to control one's conscious experiences, while access consciousness is the subjective experience of consciousness.

Phenomenal consciousness is the ability to remember one's conscious experiences, while access consciousness is the subjective experience of consciousness.

The problem of how phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of physical processes

The problem of how phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of mental processes

The problem of how phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of both physical and mental processes

The problem of how phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of neither physical nor mental processes

The problem of how mental states can cause physical events

The problem of how physical events can cause mental states

The problem of how mental states can cause other mental states

The problem of how physical events can cause other physical events

The problem of how the different parts of the brain can give rise to a single, unified conscious experience

The problem of how the different parts of the mind can give rise to a single, unified conscious experience

The problem of how the different parts of the body can give rise to a single, unified conscious experience

The problem of how the different parts of the world can give rise to a single, unified conscious experience

The argument that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe because it is something that we all experience

The argument that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe because it is something that we can't explain in terms of anything else

The argument that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe because it is something that is necessary for our survival

The argument that consciousness is a fundamental property of the universe because it is something that is beautiful and awe-inspiring

The argument that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain because it is something that cannot be predicted from the properties of its constituent parts

The argument that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain because it is something that is not present in the individual parts of the brain

The argument that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain because it is something that is only present in the brain when it is functioning properly

The argument that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain because it is something that is only present in the brain when it is interacting with the environment

The argument that the panpsychist theory is simpler than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate mental realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is simpler than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate physical realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is simpler than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate mental or physical realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is simpler than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of any separate realms

The argument that the panpsychist theory is more naturalistic than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate mental realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is more naturalistic than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate physical realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is more naturalistic than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of a separate mental or physical realm

The argument that the panpsychist theory is more naturalistic than the physicalist theory because it does not require the postulation of any separate realms