According to functionalism, mental states are not defined by their physical structure, subjective experience, or neural correlates, but rather by their causal role in an organism's behavior and interactions with the environment.

Functionalism suggests that we can infer the mental states of others by observing their behavior and making inferences about the causal role that these mental states play in their actions and reactions.

Functionalism proposes that mental states are supervenient on physical states, meaning that they are dependent on and determined by the physical states of the brain and nervous system.

Functionalism suggests that consciousness is a product of the brain's global workspace, a hypothetical neural network that integrates information from various brain regions and allows for the unified and coherent experience of conscious awareness.

One of the main criticisms of functionalism is that it ignores the subjective experience of consciousness, which is a fundamental aspect of mental life that cannot be fully captured by its causal role in behavior.

Hilary Putnam is widely regarded as the founder of functionalism, having introduced the concept in his influential 1960 paper 'Minds and Machines'.

Multiple realizability is the idea that the same mental state can be realized in different physical systems, such as different brain structures or even different types of computers.

Functionalism generally acknowledges the existence of qualia as a fundamental aspect of mental life, although different functionalists may have different views on their nature and relationship to physical states.

David Chalmers is known for his thought experiment involving a 'philosophical zombie', which he uses to argue that consciousness is a fundamental property that cannot be reduced to physical processes.

Functionalism is the theory that mental states are defined by their causal role in an organism's interactions with the environment.

Functionalism argues that mental states are not dependent on the physical structure of the brain, but rather on their causal role in an organism's behavior and interactions with the environment.

Thomas Nagel is known for his theory of 'qualia' and his argument that they are irreducible to physical processes, which he presented in his influential paper 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?'

Physicalism is the theory that mental states are identical to physical states.

Functionalism generally claims that free will is compatible with determinism, arguing that the causal role of mental states in behavior does not necessarily imply a lack of freedom or agency.

Hilary Putnam is known for his theory of 'multiple realizability', which he introduced in his influential 1967 paper 'The Nature of Mental States'.