A theorem that states that it is impossible to design a social welfare function that satisfies certain desirable properties.

A theorem that states that it is impossible to design a social welfare function that is Pareto efficient.

A theorem that states that it is impossible to design a social welfare function that is unanimous.

A theorem that states that it is impossible to design a social welfare function that is independent of the distribution of income.

Pareto efficiency, unanimity, and independence of the distribution of income.

Pareto efficiency, transitivity, and independence of the distribution of income.

Pareto efficiency, unanimity, and transitivity.

Pareto efficiency, transitivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.

A situation in which it is impossible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off.

A situation in which it is impossible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off, or without making someone else no better off.

A situation in which it is impossible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off, or without making someone else no better off, or without making someone else no worse off.

A situation in which it is impossible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off, or without making someone else no better off, or without making someone else no worse off, or without making someone else better off.

A situation in which all individuals agree on the ranking of social outcomes.

A situation in which all individuals agree on the ranking of social outcomes, or in which there is no majority preference for any one outcome.

A situation in which all individuals agree on the ranking of social outcomes, or in which there is no majority preference for any one outcome, or in which there is no minority preference for any one outcome.

A situation in which all individuals agree on the ranking of social outcomes, or in which there is no majority preference for any one outcome, or in which there is no minority preference for any one outcome, or in which there is no unanimous preference for any one outcome.

A property of a social welfare function that states that the ranking of social outcomes should not depend on the distribution of income among individuals.

A property of a social welfare function that states that the ranking of social outcomes should not depend on the distribution of income among individuals, or on the distribution of wealth among individuals.

A property of a social welfare function that states that the ranking of social outcomes should not depend on the distribution of income among individuals, or on the distribution of wealth among individuals, or on the distribution of power among individuals.

A property of a social welfare function that states that the ranking of social outcomes should not depend on the distribution of income among individuals, or on the distribution of wealth among individuals, or on the distribution of power among individuals, or on the distribution of opportunities among individuals.

It implies that it is impossible to design economic policies and institutions that are Pareto efficient, unanimous, and independent of the distribution of income.

It implies that it is impossible to design economic policies and institutions that are Pareto efficient and unanimous.

It implies that it is impossible to design economic policies and institutions that are Pareto efficient and independent of the distribution of income.

It implies that it is impossible to design economic policies and institutions that are unanimous and independent of the distribution of income.

Use a social welfare function that does not satisfy all of the desirable properties.

Use a social welfare function that satisfies some of the desirable properties, but not all of them.

Use a social welfare function that satisfies some of the desirable properties, but not all of them, and then use a compensation mechanism to address the distributional consequences of the policy.

Use a social welfare function that satisfies some of the desirable properties, but not all of them, and then use a compensation mechanism to address the distributional consequences of the policy, and then use a participatory process to involve citizens in the decision-making process.

A mechanism that is used to transfer resources from one individual to another in order to address the distributional consequences of a policy.

A mechanism that is used to transfer resources from one individual to another in order to address the distributional consequences of a policy, or to address the distributional consequences of a market outcome.

A mechanism that is used to transfer resources from one individual to another in order to address the distributional consequences of a policy, or to address the distributional consequences of a market outcome, or to address the distributional consequences of a social welfare function.

A mechanism that is used to transfer resources from one individual to another in order to address the distributional consequences of a policy, or to address the distributional consequences of a market outcome, or to address the distributional consequences of a social welfare function, or to address the distributional consequences of a decision-making process.

A process that involves citizens in the decision-making process.

A process that involves citizens in the decision-making process, or in the policy-making process.

A process that involves citizens in the decision-making process, or in the policy-making process, or in the implementation process.

A process that involves citizens in the decision-making process, or in the policy-making process, or in the implementation process, or in the evaluation process.

The difficulty of measuring individual preferences.

The difficulty of aggregating individual preferences into a social welfare function.

The difficulty of designing policies and institutions that are Pareto efficient and unanimous.

The difficulty of designing policies and institutions that are Pareto efficient and independent of the distribution of income.

The development of new social welfare functions that satisfy some of the desirable properties, but not all of them.

The development of new compensation mechanisms to address the distributional consequences of policies and institutions.

The development of new participatory processes to involve citizens in the decision-making process.

All of the above.

Whether it is possible to design a social welfare function that satisfies all of the desirable properties.

Whether it is possible to design a compensation mechanism that is Pareto efficient and unanimous.

Whether it is possible to design a participatory process that is effective and inclusive.

All of the above.

The design of economic policies and institutions.

The design of social welfare programs.

The design of environmental policies.

All of the above.

It assumes that individuals have well-defined preferences.

It assumes that individuals are rational.

It assumes that there is no uncertainty.

All of the above.

Allowing individuals to have incomplete preferences.

Allowing individuals to be irrational.

Introducing uncertainty.

All of the above.