Compatibilism holds that free will and determinism are not necessarily incompatible, and that it is possible for both to be true at the same time.

Incompatibilism asserts that free will and determinism are fundamentally incompatible, and that if one is true, the other must be false.

The argument from manipulation contends that if our actions are determined, then we cannot be held morally responsible for them, because we are not truly free agents.

The argument from moral responsibility asserts that in order to hold someone morally responsible for their actions, they must have had the freedom to choose otherwise.

Compatibilists often respond to the argument from manipulation by distinguishing between hard determinism, which holds that all events are predetermined, and soft determinism, which allows for some degree of freedom within a deterministic framework.

The argument from alternative possibilities contends that even if our actions are causally determined, it is still possible that we could have acted otherwise, because there were genuine alternative possibilities available to us.

One common objection to the argument from alternative possibilities is the problem of counterfactuals, which raises the question of how we can know what would have happened if we had made different choices.

The argument from divine foreknowledge contends that if God knows everything that will happen, including our actions, then our actions cannot be truly free, because they are already predetermined.

One common response to the argument from divine foreknowledge is the argument from divine middle knowledge, which holds that God knows what would have happened if we had made different choices, even though those choices were never actually made.

The argument from moral luck contends that our moral responsibility for our actions depends on factors beyond our control, such as our upbringing, our social environment, and our genetic makeup.

One common objection to the argument from moral luck is the argument from free will, which holds that we are morally responsible for our actions because we have the freedom to choose otherwise.

The argument from free will asserts that we are morally responsible for our actions because we have the freedom to choose otherwise, and that without free will, moral responsibility would be impossible.

One common objection to the argument from free will is the problem of counterfactuals, which raises the question of how we can know what would have happened if we had made different choices.

The argument from manipulation contends that if our actions are determined, then we cannot be held morally responsible for them, because we are not truly free agents.

Compatibilists often respond to the argument from manipulation by distinguishing between hard determinism, which holds that all events are predetermined, and soft determinism, which allows for some degree of freedom within a deterministic framework.