The author of the passage would agree with which of the all of the following?

1. it was primarily because of the burgeoning deficit in the oil pool account that the existing system could not be sustained.
2. the only alternative the government had was to find a system to insulate consumers from the price fluctuations without doing much harm to the economy.
3. the 'Administered Price Mechanisms' was never a mechanism with truly decontrolled prices.
4. the oil companies faced the brunt of high oil prices by passing these on to the customers.

Directions: Read the following passage and answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

Given the burgeoning Oil Pool Account deficits, the Government had its task cut out: it had to grapple with the sensitive oil prices issue without further delay. There was no alternative to finding a system that insulates (to an extent) consumers without causing undue hardship to the fiscal. The new arrangement can only be a halfway house, to be refined over time. The eventual goal must be to evolve a system that balances the often conflicting interests of all the stakeholders in this critical sector. Of special importance is the functioning of the public sector oil companies that have been saddled with the twin tasks of taking on global competition and meeting social commitments within India. In the era of supposedly decontrolled prices, they were asked to subsidise two products of mass consumption — LPG and kerosene. It is politically clear that the arrangement will continue into the foreseeable future. What is more, the new arrangement itself calls attention to the fact that managerial autonomy for the oil companies remains a distant goal. In the recent past, they bore the brunt of high oil prices without being able to pass it on to consumers. That along with the burden of cross–subsidies on LPG and kerosene has eroded their profitability. For now, at any rate, there does not seem to be a better method of cushioning the impact of global oil prices.

Which of the following cannot be inferred about the new mechanisms from the passage?

1. The new mechanism strikes a fine balance between conflicting interests of various stakeholders in the oil sector.
2. The new arrangement provides the much sought after managerial autonomy to the oil companies.
3. The new arrangement is not the perfect solution and therefore will have to be modified in the offing.

Directions: Read the following passage and answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

Given the burgeoning Oil Pool Account deficits, the Government had its task cut out: it had to grapple with the sensitive oil prices issue without further delay. There was no alternative to finding a system that insulates (to an extent) consumers without causing undue hardship to the fiscal. The new arrangement can only be a halfway house, to be refined over time. The eventual goal must be to evolve a system that balances the often conflicting interests of all the stakeholders in this critical sector. Of special importance is the functioning of the public sector oil companies that have been saddled with the twin tasks of taking on global competition and meeting social commitments within India. In the era of supposedly decontrolled prices, they were asked to subsidise two products of mass consumption — LPG and kerosene. It is politically clear that the arrangement will continue into the foreseeable future. What is more, the new arrangement itself calls attention to the fact that managerial autonomy for the oil companies remains a distant goal. In the recent past, they bore the brunt of high oil prices without being able to pass it on to consumers. That along with the burden of cross–subsidies on LPG and kerosene has eroded their profitability. For now, at any rate, there does not seem to be a better method of cushioning the impact of global oil prices.

The author seems to be making a case for

Passage:
The economy, which has been on life support for the past five years, is showing signs that it might be beginning to breathe on its own but is too early to take it off the ventilator. We’ve been down this road before, only to rush back to the ER. This time, however, it seems that the swallow might just be really signaling the spring, or perhaps something close to it. With new jobs being created at a pace faster than ever in the last four years, it is expected that consumer spending will rise. With more youngsters landing jobs and moving out of their parents’ homes, a recovery in the housing market can possibly be foreseen. The economic slowdown in other parts of the world is unlikely to weigh down the economy any more than it is already. With exports rising, and domestic consumption showing a rise for the last three quarters consecutively, it is possible that we might have bounced off the bottom.
However, it is imperative that we recognize the recovery for what it is. It is not just an increase in demand, but more importantly, a result of policy initiatives that have engineered this change in the direction. It is possible that a move away from what has worked to help a stagnant economy to start walking with a heavy limp might precipitate a situation that is worse than it was four years ago.

The author is likely to agree with all of the following, EXCEPT

Passage:
The economy, which has been on life support for the past five years, is showing signs that it might be beginning to breathe on its own but is too early to take it off the ventilator. We’ve been down this road before, only to rush back to the ER. This time, however, it seems that the swallow might just be really signaling the spring, or perhaps something close to it. With new jobs being created at a pace faster than ever in the last four years, it is expected that consumer spending will rise. With more youngsters landing jobs and moving out of their parents’ homes, a recovery in the housing market can possibly be foreseen. The economic slowdown in other parts of the world is unlikely to weigh down the economy any more than it is already. With exports rising, and domestic consumption showing a rise for the last three quarters consecutively, it is possible that we might have bounced off the bottom.
However, it is imperative that we recognize the recovery for what it is. It is not just an increase in demand, but more importantly, a result of policy initiatives that have engineered this change in the direction. It is possible that a move away from what has worked to help a stagnant economy to start walking with a heavy limp might precipitate a situation that is worse than it was four years ago.

Which among the following is true about the proposed amendment of Art 356?

1. It should ensure that Art 356 is used as the last resort.
2. The proposed amendment will be the first step to check the misuse of the Art 356.
3. There has been a broad consensus regarding amendment of Art 356.
4. The proposed amendment will try to minimize the chances of the misuse of Art 356.

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter-State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. The suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a speaking order is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non-extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a dead letter, something that would never be called into operation. The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

What is the primary purpose of the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter-State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. The suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a speaking order is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non-extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a dead letter, something that would never be called into operation. The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

Which of the following can be inferred from the passage?

I. The S.R. Bommai case judgement acted as a salutary check against the misuse of Art 356. II. The possibility of judicial review of the imposition of Art 356 deterred the use of the article for narrow political ends. III. State governments cannot be dismissed under any condition if they have majority in the assembly.

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – III

The broad consensus that emerged at the Inter-State Council meeting over what is arguably the Constitution's most contentious provision — Article 356 — is a most welcome thing. The spirit of cooperative federalism has raised the hope of a constitutional amendment that will build safeguards into this emergency provision to prevent its misuse. Article 356 gives the Centre the power to take over the functions of a State Government in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State. However, the history of its use clearly reveals that it was invoked more often to fix politically inconvenient State Governments, precipitate fresh elections and for other reasons that have no relevance to the purpose of the Article.

In recent years, the judgment in the Bommai case has served as a salutary check — and indeed bar — against such misuse. The Court's ruling that the Centre cannot dissolve State legislatures unless the proclamation under Article 356 (1) is approved by the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha has served as an effective restraint during a period when no party or combination of parties has enjoyed a majority in both Houses of Parliament. This pronouncement has deterred the use of the Article for narrow, political ends. Between 1950 and 1994, when the Bommai judgment was delivered, Article 356 was used on more than 90 occasions. In many cases, State Governments were dismissed even when they enjoyed a majority in the Assembly and in other cases, without being given an opportunity to prove their strength on the floor of the House.

Among other things, such an amendment must ensure that, if used at all, the recourse to Article 356 must be a last resort — one that is embraced after exhausting the options provided by other Articles in the Constitution such as 256, 257 and, more importantly, 355. The suggestion that the Governor's report recommending President's Rule should be in the nature of a speaking order is virtually identical to the recommendation made by the NCRWC. This was that such a report should contain a precise and clear statement of all the material facts and grounds, on the basis of which the President may satisfy himself as to the existence or otherwise of the situation contemplated in Article 356. Like some other emergency provisions in the Constitution, Article 356 was introduced as an extraordinary safeguard, not something that is invoked in non-extreme circumstances. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar even hoped it would be a dead letter, something that would never be called into operation. The purpose of the proposed constitutional amendment should be to ensure that this democratic vision of cooperative federalism comes true, however late in the day.

What is the primary purpose of the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – I

By setting up a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the possibilities of a Constitution Amendment Bill to provide for job reservation to the forward castes on economic grounds, the Union Government has set the ball rolling for yet another controversy on the concept of quotas. The Prime Minister's commitment came in response to a resolution orchestrated by the Chief Minister recommending statutory changes to reserve 14 per cent of Government jobs for the poor among the forward castes. The Chief Minister's shrewd move put immense pressure on parties and groups across the political spectrum. A campaign on the same issue by the Social Justice Front has been in full swing for some time; it gained strength after Jats were included in the list of Other Backward Classes a couple of years ago.

In a State where the forward castes continue to play a significant role in determining election outcomes, CM's move set the terms of the discourse. The high level of unemployment is a general problem, but it is particularly severe among people belonging to the forward castes. The proportion of educated unemployed should, after all, be higher among the forward castes than among castes kept out of the education system over the years. Political parties across the spectrum can hardly afford to gloss over this reality in a context where the Government continues to be seen as the provider of jobs. Add to this the sense of power that comes with Government jobs in most parts of India and one can understand the desperation in the quest for such opportunities.

A constitutional amendment, however, is not as simple as it is made out to be. A proposal to include the poor among the forward castes in the reservation bracket was made by the Congress party in the context of implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendation. The Narasimha Rao Government's proposal to reserve 10 per cent of Government jobs for the poor among the forward castes was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1992. Article 15 (4) of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, is very specific. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes aside, it sanctions special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes. Article 16 (4) sanctions reservation in Government jobs for any backward class of citizens, which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Article 340 relates to the appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes. What is established by a series of Supreme Court judgments is that only social and educational circumstances can be taken as determinants of backwardness. The proposal now is to amend the Constitution, but amendments are subject to judicial review and need to avoid falling foul of the `basic structure' doctrine propounded and refined by the Supreme Court. A consensus among political parties might turn out to be a necessary but insufficient condition for making reservation for the poor among the forward castes a feasible proposition.

Which of the following cannot be inferred from the passage that

1. the CVC Bill will be passed and the Directive will be challenged in the court
2. the CVC Bill will be passed but the Directive will never be challenged in the court
3. the CVC Bill will fail in the lower house
4. if the CVC Bill is passed, there is a great probability that it will be challenged in the court
   

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – II

There was some fierce criticism of the Central Vigilance Commission Bill before it was passed in the Rajya Sabha, thus paving the way for its enactment. Unfortunately, there was not enough. More than one provision in the Bill — which gives the office of the CVC a statutory status and broad superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation — may deserve to be critically examined. The introduction of one clause deserves to be roundly condemned. What Section 6A does is to restore the so-called `Single Directive', an iniquitous rule or guideline that was explicitly and unambiguously quashed by the Supreme Court. Under the Single Directive, it was mandatory for the CBI to secure the prior approval of the Central Government before launching an investigation into a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act if the allegations related to an official of the rank of Joint Secretary or higher. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain/Jain hawala judgment of 1997 struck down the Directive. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner..., the Court had observed when striking down the Directive.

Against this background, the very presence of section 6A in the CVC Bill is mischievous. It is particularly shocking when one considers that an earlier bid to smuggle the Directive into the CVC ordinance had met with grave judicial disapproval. This eventually resulted in the ordinance being amended, with the offending provision thrown out. It is mystifying why, having been bitten once, the Government is not shy of daring the Supreme Court again. What the resurfacing of the Directive suggests is that, when it comes to issues where it has a vested interest, the higher bureaucracy can exercise an extraordinary influence over its political masters.

The much bigger issue of course is that the Directive can be, and has been, used to stymie the investigation of corruption cases. Since some of these cases involve a conspiratorial nexus between bureaucrats and politicians, many politicians clearly have a vested interest in keeping the Directive alive. The cynical manner in which such self-serving legal protection is perceived was evident during the debate on the CVC Bill. One of the issues discussed was this: when such protection existed for bureaucrats, why was there no such cover for MPs? The Supreme Court struck down the Directive on the grounds that it was discriminatory and that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between decision-making officers and other bureaucrats for the purpose of investigating an offence for which they were accused. After the Bill is formally enacted, it is virtually certain that the Directive will be challenged in Court. It never pays to speculate about the workings of the judicial mind, but there will be no surprise if the Directive is struck down, if the Government is taken sternly to task, and if the Court has the last laugh.

What is the main idea of the passage?

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – II

There was some fierce criticism of the Central Vigilance Commission Bill before it was passed in the Rajya Sabha, thus paving the way for its enactment. Unfortunately, there was not enough. More than one provision in the Bill — which gives the office of the CVC a statutory status and broad superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation — may deserve to be critically examined. The introduction of one clause deserves to be roundly condemned. What Section 6A does is to restore the so-called `Single Directive', an iniquitous rule or guideline that was explicitly and unambiguously quashed by the Supreme Court. Under the Single Directive, it was mandatory for the CBI to secure the prior approval of the Central Government before launching an investigation into a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act if the allegations related to an official of the rank of Joint Secretary or higher. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain/Jain hawala judgment of 1997 struck down the Directive. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner..., the Court had observed when striking down the Directive.

Against this background, the very presence of section 6A in the CVC Bill is mischievous. It is particularly shocking when one considers that an earlier bid to smuggle the Directive into the CVC ordinance had met with grave judicial disapproval. This eventually resulted in the ordinance being amended, with the offending provision thrown out. It is mystifying why, having been bitten once, the Government is not shy of daring the Supreme Court again. What the resurfacing of the Directive suggests is that, when it comes to issues where it has a vested interest, the higher bureaucracy can exercise an extraordinary influence over its political masters.

The much bigger issue of course is that the Directive can be, and has been, used to stymie the investigation of corruption cases. Since some of these cases involve a conspiratorial nexus between bureaucrats and politicians, many politicians clearly have a vested interest in keeping the Directive alive. The cynical manner in which such self-serving legal protection is perceived was evident during the debate on the CVC Bill. One of the issues discussed was this: when such protection existed for bureaucrats, why was there no such cover for MPs? The Supreme Court struck down the Directive on the grounds that it was discriminatory and that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between decision-making officers and other bureaucrats for the purpose of investigating an offence for which they were accused. After the Bill is formally enacted, it is virtually certain that the Directive will be challenged in Court. It never pays to speculate about the workings of the judicial mind, but there will be no surprise if the Directive is struck down, if the Government is taken sternly to task, and if the Court has the last laugh.

Which of the following can be inferred from the passage? I. As per the Supreme Court judgments, only social circumstances can be taken as a determinant of backwardness. II. The constitution stipulates that an amendment should not alter its basic structure. III. Under certain circumstances amendment might be allowed to change the basic structure of the constitution.

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – I

By setting up a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the possibilities of a Constitution Amendment Bill to provide for job reservation to the forward castes on economic grounds, the Union Government has set the ball rolling for yet another controversy on the concept of quotas. The Prime Minister's commitment came in response to a resolution orchestrated by the Chief Minister recommending statutory changes to reserve 14 per cent of Government jobs for the poor among the forward castes. The Chief Minister's shrewd move put immense pressure on parties and groups across the political spectrum. A campaign on the same issue by the Social Justice Front has been in full swing for some time; it gained strength after Jats were included in the list of Other Backward Classes a couple of years ago.

In a State where the forward castes continue to play a significant role in determining election outcomes, CM's move set the terms of the discourse. The high level of unemployment is a general problem, but it is particularly severe among people belonging to the forward castes. The proportion of educated unemployed should, after all, be higher among the forward castes than among castes kept out of the education system over the years. Political parties across the spectrum can hardly afford to gloss over this reality in a context where the Government continues to be seen as the provider of jobs. Add to this the sense of power that comes with Government jobs in most parts of India and one can understand the desperation in the quest for such opportunities.

A constitutional amendment, however, is not as simple as it is made out to be. A proposal to include the poor among the forward castes in the reservation bracket was made by the Congress party in the context of implementing the Mandal Commission's recommendation. The Narasimha Rao Government's proposal to reserve 10 per cent of Government jobs for the poor among the forward castes was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1992. Article 15 (4) of the Constitution, inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, is very specific. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes aside, it sanctions special provisions for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes. Article 16 (4) sanctions reservation in Government jobs for any backward class of citizens, which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Article 340 relates to the appointment of a Commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes. What is established by a series of Supreme Court judgments is that only social and educational circumstances can be taken as determinants of backwardness. The proposal now is to amend the Constitution, but amendments are subject to judicial review and need to avoid falling foul of the `basic structure' doctrine propounded and refined by the Supreme Court. A consensus among political parties might turn out to be a necessary but insufficient condition for making reservation for the poor among the forward castes a feasible proposition.

Which of the following cannot be concluded from the passage?

1. the single directive inclusion in the CVC Bill was permitted by the judiciary
2. an earlier attempt to include the single directive into the CVC Bill was thwarted by the judiciary
3. inclusion of the single directive has been unanimously supported by both the houses of the Parliament

Directions: Read the following passage and then answer the question that follows:

PASSAGE – II

There was some fierce criticism of the Central Vigilance Commission Bill before it was passed in the Rajya Sabha, thus paving the way for its enactment. Unfortunately, there was not enough. More than one provision in the Bill — which gives the office of the CVC a statutory status and broad superintendence over the Central Bureau of Investigation — may deserve to be critically examined. The introduction of one clause deserves to be roundly condemned. What Section 6A does is to restore the so-called `Single Directive', an iniquitous rule or guideline that was explicitly and unambiguously quashed by the Supreme Court. Under the Single Directive, it was mandatory for the CBI to secure the prior approval of the Central Government before launching an investigation into a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act if the allegations related to an official of the rank of Joint Secretary or higher. The Supreme Court in the Vineet Narain/Jain hawala judgment of 1997 struck down the Directive. Every person accused of committing the same offence is to be dealt with in the same manner..., the Court had observed when striking down the Directive.

Against this background, the very presence of section 6A in the CVC Bill is mischievous. It is particularly shocking when one considers that an earlier bid to smuggle the Directive into the CVC ordinance had met with grave judicial disapproval. This eventually resulted in the ordinance being amended, with the offending provision thrown out. It is mystifying why, having been bitten once, the Government is not shy of daring the Supreme Court again. What the resurfacing of the Directive suggests is that, when it comes to issues where it has a vested interest, the higher bureaucracy can exercise an extraordinary influence over its political masters.

The much bigger issue of course is that the Directive can be, and has been, used to stymie the investigation of corruption cases. Since some of these cases involve a conspiratorial nexus between bureaucrats and politicians, many politicians clearly have a vested interest in keeping the Directive alive. The cynical manner in which such self-serving legal protection is perceived was evident during the debate on the CVC Bill. One of the issues discussed was this: when such protection existed for bureaucrats, why was there no such cover for MPs? The Supreme Court struck down the Directive on the grounds that it was discriminatory and that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing between decision-making officers and other bureaucrats for the purpose of investigating an offence for which they were accused. After the Bill is formally enacted, it is virtually certain that the Directive will be challenged in Court. It never pays to speculate about the workings of the judicial mind, but there will be no surprise if the Directive is struck down, if the Government is taken sternly to task, and if the Court has the last laugh.